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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
After the fall of the Roman Empire, its successor, the Byzantine Empire or
Eastern Roman Empire had to contend with the ancient enemy of Sassanid Persia and the
new threat of Islam that came like a firestorm out of Arabia. By A.D. 610 the Persians
were on the verge of shattering the Byzantine Empire. Then a general and emperor had
arrived who would use blitzkrieg tactics and strategy to smash the Persians; the use of the
word blitzkrieg, while seemingly anachronistic, serves to illustrate the tactics and strategy
used by the Emperor Heraclius. He would invade his enemy’s homeland while they
pursued him across the Fertile Crescent. Striking into the weakened areas like the
blitzkriegs of 1939 and 1940, Heraclius used mobility and speed to throw off his enemies
and he possessed the army capable of it. He used the three forces of his army for
combined arms tactics that enabled him to gain all the advantages possible in any given
battlefield situation. He would employ his cavalry like the panzers of the twentieth
century to sweep around enemy flanks or smash centers of fierce resistance; the infantry
of Heraclius would be like the infantry of any period, only used to great effect and speed
with the élan and courage rarely found amongst the corps, and his archers would be used
to soften and weaken the enemy both offensively and defensively as suited Heraclius.
Only Heraclius could have wielded these forces effectively against his foes to achieve
victory; with any other Byzantine commander these revolutionary tactics would have
2been monumentally difficult if not unworkable. Unfortunately the tactics and strategy of
the Byzantines under Heraclius was not used to its fullest potential against the nascent
and wild Arabs who succeeded in conquering forever huge portions of the Byzantine
Empire, for without the presence of Heraclius and his use of lightning tactics and strategy
victory was impossible. Heraclius was the reason that victory against the Persians became
a reality and his absence was the reason for the catastrophic defeats suffered against the
Muslims.
Though many excellent monographs and other works have been done on the
subjects of the Emperor Heraclius, the Byzantine Army, The Sassanid Army, the Arab
forces, and the battles of Nineveh and the Yarmouk, this work approaches the subject
from a multifaceted stance that few other writers have tried before. The noted Byzantinist
Walter Kaegi, has written many fine works on the Byzantine Empire and the Muslim
Arabs; However, he has never approached the subject from point of view that deals
entirely with the strategy and tactics of the Arab Conquests. Kaegi’s work, Byzantium
and the Early Islamic Conquests, does have immense value for those who wish to get a
macrocosm of the Byzantine Empire on the verge, during, and post Arab conquests. In
addition he has also written a biography on the Emperor Heraclius, Heraclius, Emperor
of Byzantium, this too evaluates the skill of Heraclius but ultimately he does not designate
Heraclius as the only man who could have saved the Byzantine Empire at the Yarmouk
as he did at Nineveh. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Warren Treadgold has written
several works on the composition, logistics, size and command structure of the Byzantine
Army, particularly of the centuries previous to the Byzantine defeat at Manzikert in 1071.
Byzantium and Its Army, 284-1081, Treadgold’s work, does not often examine any one
3battle in particular. In this case he does examine the Persian Wars and the Arab
Conquests using his methods concerning composition, command structure, and so forth.
Treadgold does not scrutinize the Yarmouk and Nineveh in nature of tactical and
strategic points of view. The Battle of Nineveh was largely recorded by Theophanes as he
lived less than a century after the titanic clash. His Chronographia has been both
criticized and praised as a work that is inaccurate of the early centuries of the empire and
confusing with dates, but becomes far more accurate and useful as he approaches the time
of Justinian. His work on Heraclius is a great use as much of this history would have been
lost. Even the noted Gibbons, who despised most Byzantine institutions, recognized the
immense value of Theophanes’ work. For Nineveh, his work is admittedly biased for the
Byzantine favor. However, this should not discount the movements of the battle. The
tactics and outcome are well described in various sources, both primary and secondary.
Persian sources are impossible to come by as most sources that covered Nineveh were
destroyed during the Arab conquests and subsequent centuries. It is Theophanes who
serves as the best historian of the event, despite his biases both ecclesiastical and secular.
As with Nineveh, Theophanes is the prime source for the Byzantine movements
and actions surrounding the campaign. As with Nineveh he possesses his biases. In the
case of the Byzantine victory at Nineveh, the more poetic prose of a noble defeat is
necessary. However, even Theophanes realizes the flaws in Byzantine tactics that
ultimately cost victory for the Byzantines.1 Fortunately, unlike the regrettable loss of
Persian sources on Nineveh, several Muslim sources survive that record the battle. The
work considered most accurate by historians is the work by Muhammad ibn Jarir al-
Tabari. The Muslim Persian scholar lived over two centuries after the battle. His History
1 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. C. De Boor (Leipzig, 1883)156.
4of the Prophets and Kings, is a largely religious work that covers the history of the
Muslim world with smaller sections on the history of the world before the coming of
Muhammad. However, his work on the Battle of the Yarmouk River is invaluable in that
is paints a clear picture of Muslim forces on the eve battle and their losses afterward. The
description of the battle is slight and has little of the tactical flow that Theophanes
possesses but he does relate several incidents that occurred during the battle that
Theophanes does not include, if he even knew of them. Al-Tabari’s biases too are
obvious. He paints a religious imagery that is typical of Islamic historians but he does
address the Muslim conquests well and with relative accuracy.2
In addition to a historiography it may necessary to define the concepts of strategy
and tactics. Neither word is interchangeable and possesses as much difference of
definition as macroeconomics does to microeconomics. Tactics is warfare on the smaller
scale with only a handful of units. Strategy, on the other hand is, in this case, warfare on a
far larger scale. For example, the taking of an individual city such as Constantinople
would require tactics to overcome its walls, defenders, and dealing with its Greek Fire.
The overall concept of capturing Constantinople in battle, requires a strategy that needs to
consider the tactics in taking the city, ensuring that no other Byzantine force will reach
the beleaguered city to relieve it, how to supply the forces that are in the overall
campaign. That is strategy on the small scale. However, to enlarge this, strategy can also
be waged on a scale that changes the face of the war as a whole. The Muslims would do
this latter to ensure that they used their strengths to the maximum effect while playing off
Byzantine weaknesses. General Douglas MacArthur would use overall strategy thirteen
centuries later when he waged an island hopping campaign to bypass Japanese
2 Kaegi, Walter. Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests. (New York, Cambridge Press. 1992.)105.
5strongholds in the Pacific and seize islands that were less defended with just as much
strategic importance. To reiterate, strategy affects conflict on the overall war being waged
or in the slightly lesser theatre of the campaign. Tactics are to be found in the individual
battles.
In addition the question of the size of forces must be considered. Numbers for
any battle of this period or even those up until the twentieth century have been difficult to
ascertain. The most reliable source for numbers is the quartermaster’s figures. The
numbers of foodstuffs, weaponry, sundry supplies is a fair indicator of size of forces.
Unfortunately, these are not always true to form. Corrupt generals, inefficient
quartermasters, and scheming troops of any century result in numbers that can be
deceptive. In addition the strategy of an army may also change numbers. For example,
William Tecumseh Sherman in his March through Georgia effectively cut his supplies.
Sherman took only enough supplies in food and ammunition to feed only half of his
army. The army would need to live off the land of starve, and Sherman was not the only
practitioner of this. In summation, while numbers can be guessed and speculated to
roundabout sizes, the true size of forces will probably never be fully determined.
When the Roman Empire of the West began its death throes towards the end of
the fourth century, a greater star rose in the East on the banks of the Bosphorous. The city
of Constantinople was to become the heart of an empire that was descendant to Rome but
in many ways was different from the old Rome on the Tiber. Constantinople was a more
modern city built on the ancient Greek polis of Byzantium. The city and its people were
more Hellenized, had far more of a Christian presence than Rome, and possessed the
trade and wealth of the East to assist its growth and prosperity. When the Rome of old,
6ravaged and ransacked by the Germanic tribes, fell, the city of Constantine would hold
back the tide and save the known world from entering entirely into a dark age.3
In the following centuries the Byzantine Empire, struggled to survive the
onslaughts from all directions. In the fifth century Germanic barbarians came and stole
away provinces of the Byzantine Empire on the North African coast, the Vandals, and
much of the Italian Peninsula, the Goths.4 The fierce and terrible Huns, who had ravaged
Rome itself in previous centuries, turned their attention on the weakened Eastern Roman
Empire by attacking the Balkans and raiding deep into Thrace.5 But the worst news came
from the East where the Sassanid Persians renewed their wars against the Empire. The
Sassanids were in many ways the equals to any westernized nation and army, though they
had originally come out of the east as wild horsemen. They were a cosmopolitan empire
with great cities like their capital at Ctesiphon and possessed a crack army that had forced
Rome into stalemate wars along the Tigris-Euphrates.6 For all those advantages, the
Sassanids possessed one more that made defeating them almost an impossibility: their
empire was large and non-centralized and could withstand invaders seizing large sections
of that empire.7
The reuniting of the old Roman Empire was an idea pursued to some extent or
another by the successors of Constantine. Of all those who tried, the greatest attempt was
made by Justinian and his genius general, Belisarius in the early sixth century. Justinian’s
3 Romilly Jenkins, Byzantium: The Imperial Centuries, A.D. 610-1071.(London: Weidenfield and Nicolson,
1966), 2.
4 George Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, translated. Joan Hussey (New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press, 1969), 34.
5 Theophylact Simocatta, Historiae, ed. C. De Boor. rev. P. Wirth (Stuttgart, 1972), 41.
6 George Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, translated. Joan Hussey (New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press, 1969), 70.
7 Romilly Jenkins, Byzantium: The Imperial Centuries, A.D. 610-1071.(London: Weidenfield and Nicolson,
1966), 11.
7gains of Italy, North Africa, and Southern Spain were remarkable achievements but
regrettably short-lived. In the east, along the Tigris-Euphrates and the Levant, Belisarius
was superb in his ability to force the Sassanids to a standstill and bloody attrition.8
Belisarius, using far fewer men and fewer resources, was able to defeat the Persians at the
Battle of Dara in 530 A.D. Belisarius was able to stem the tide of the Persian advance and
hold a defensive frontier which would serve as a buffer for a century against the
Persians.9
The rulers of Byzantium, after the death of Justinian, attempted to stave off their
ever shrinking borders from the threat of Sassanid Persia. In many cases, these defeats
were a result of poor leadership and bad luck on the part of the Byzantine commanders,
none of whom were up to par with Belisarius. It was not until the crowning of Emperor
Heraclius that a leader came forth who could challenge the might of Persia and restore
Byzantium to its former glory. It was Heraclius who would use his strategic guile and
tactical cunning to attack the Persians and end the war that had so long devastated the
Empire.
8 George Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, translated. Joan Hussey (New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press, 1969), 70.
9 Theophylact Simocatta, Historiae, ed. C. De Boor. rev. P. Wirth (Stuttgart, 1972), 53.
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HERACLIUS’ STRATEGY AND THE COMPOSITION OF
BYZANTINE AND SASSANID ARMIES
Heraclius, the greatest of Byzantium’s warrior emperors, with the aid of his
father, the elder Heraclius, deposed the usurper Emperor Phocas and began his reign in
610 A.D.10 The reign of Phocas possessed all the usual signs of poor administration and
flagrant debauchery associated with the old Roman emperors, Nero and Commodus.11
Phocas had taken the crown from the previous Emperor Maurice in a combination of
palace intrigue and assassination in 602. Heraclius the Elder, the exarch (governor) of the
Byzantine province of Africa, was no friend of Phocas but also realized that any chance
for deposing Phocas would take years of successful maneuvering, both covertly and
overtly.12
In the East, the Sassanids returned to wage war against Phocas as a way to both
punish the usurper and enlarge their empire, though mostly the latter. Chosroes II, king of
the Sassanids, began a war to avenge the death of Emperor Maurice, whom Chosroes II
10 Andreas Stratos, Byzantium in the Seventh Century. vol. 1, 602-634, trans. Marc Ogilvie-Grant
(Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1968), 126.
11 Theophylact Simocatta, Historiae, ed. C. De Boor. rev. P. Wirth (Stuttgart, 1972), 78.
12 Theophylact Simocatta, Historiae, ed. C. De Boor. rev. P. Wirth (Stuttgart, 1972). 82.
9considered his friend and mentor.13 Phocas’ sacking and execution of Maurice’s
competent and able generals proved to be the downfall of the Byzantines.14 The
Byzantine armies, as a result, were no match for the well led and efficiently organized
Persians. Ironically, two of Maurice’s commanders, Heraclius and his son in Africa were
fortunately far enough away for Phocas to remove him from his post.15 In a series of
campaigns Chosroes II stripped away the Armenian, Mesopotamian, Cappadocian, and
Turkish provinces from Phocas.16 It was a low point for the empire which seemed to be
on the brink of being shattered.
At this point, Heraclius the Younger overthrew the inept Phocas with the support
of the people and senate of Constantinople. It was a relatively bloodless campaign for
Heraclius, and the greatest casualty being Phocas himself executed by Heraclius’
troops.17 Heraclius galvanized his army and people for what would become the last, great
war of the classical world. Heraclius would soon prove that his skill at bearing the crown
of Constantine would surpass almost all his predecessors.
The years between Heraclius’ coronation, 610, and the Battle of Nineveh, 627, the
battle which effectively ended the Sassanid Empire as a threat to Byzantium, were not
uneventful ones as he effectively stemmed the tide of Persian, Slavic, Avarian hordes.
While able to keep those armies from taking Constantinople, Heraclius could not stop
them from taking the great cities of Antioch, Jerusalem, Damascus, and Alexandria.18
13 C. Cornuelle, An Overview of the Sassanian Persian Military, (London: Slingshot, 1997), 132.
14 Theophylact Simocatta, Historiae, ed. C. De Boor. rev. P. Wirth (Stuttgart, 1972), 82.
15 Andreas Stratos, Byzantium in the Seventh Century. vol. 1, 602-634, trans. Marc Ogilvie-Grant
(Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1968), 57.
16 C. Cornuelle, An Overview of the Sassanian Persian Military, (London: Slingshot, 1997), 165.
17 Andreas Stratos, Byzantium in the Seventh Century. vol. 1, 602-634, trans. Marc Ogilvie-Grant
(Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1968), 78.
18 Warren Treadgold, Byzantium and Its Army: 284-1081, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995),
63.
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Though disastrous it was highly unlikely that Heraclius could have prevented the capture
of these cities as his army was exhausted and demoralized and his treasury drained. The
condition of the Byzantine armies was in such a state that Heraclius set immediately to
rebuilding the morale of the troops and high command structure.19 At this time the
Byzantine Army was not yet ready to stop the onslaught of the Persian armies. With the
remnants of a still exhausted army from Phocas’ reign, Heraclius set out to fight a war
that enabled him to use every advantage he possessed and negate every advantage that the
Sassanids had. His first move was a lightning strike into what is now northwest Iraq and
other soft spots of the Sassanid Empire. Here the largely Nestorian and Syrian Christian
population welcomed Heraclius to save them from the Persian Zoroastrian worshippers of
Ahura Mazda, embodied by eternal flames dotting holy sites across the empire.20 While
the Nestorian and Syrian Christian sects were a sizeable minority in the Sassanid Empire,
they had found themselves frequently persecuted at the hands of the Sassanid
Zoroastrians. In the years of Chosroes II the persecutions had increased dramatically.
Heraclius’ rapid movements into Transcaucasia drew away the Persian armies further
afield from the recently captured Byzantine cities. The strategy of Heraclius served
several purposes. Firstly he drew the Persian armies away from Constantinople and
prevented them from garrisoning the cities they had recently captured. Secondly,
Heraclius was able to keep his losses at a minimum and was able to increase the
experience and skill of his troops through constant skirmishes and minor battles. Lastly,
Heraclius could pick officers and sergeants, using the terms loosely, that would
19 Romilly Jenkins, Byzantium: The Imperial Centuries, A.D. 610-1071.(London: Weidenfield and
Nicolson, 1966), 20.
20 Nicephorus, Short History, ed. Cyril Mango (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks, 1990), 167.
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effectively obey and carry out with his orders with skill and initiative. This would be
necessary when he began using his combined arms strategy.
By 622, Heraclius and his improved army had the confidence and skill to take on
the elite units of the Persian army under the battle-tested generals Shahrvaraz and
Rahzahd.21 The battle was a minor one but defeat of the Persians was total. Using feigned
retreats and skillful maneuvering, Heraclius spread out the larger Persian army in a
pursuit and dealt death and destruction to every unit including the elite cataphractii of the
Sassanid Empire. The cataphractii were units of elite horsemen who were a highly
effective force of super-heavy cavalry. Using a force that probably numbered less than
10,000, Heraclius was able to inflict numerous defeats in the Persian heartland.22 This
served a twofold purpose: firstly, his victories honed his army to a fighting edge that
made them unrivalled in the entire East. Secondly, he was able to pin down tens of
thousand of Persian troops and keep them from laying siege to his capital of
Constantinople.
The latter was to pay dividends when a massive force of Avars and other Slavic
allies laid siege to the city of Constantinople. Heraclius before he set out to wage war in
the Persian heartland had considered a siege of the city was likely but realized that
victory in Mesopotamia would decide the fate of his empire as much as a siege of his
capital city. The city was not under the command of Heraclius as he was still in the field.
Instead the cities defenses were left in the hands of his capable General Bonus and
Patriarch Sergius.23 During the siege the Persians, under command of Sharvaraz, were
21 C. Cornuelle, An Overview of the Sassanian Persian Military, (London: Slingshot, 1997), 166.
22 Warren Treadgold, Byzantium and Its Army: 284-1081, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995),
36.
23 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. C. De Boor (Leipzig, 1883), 110.
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unable to bring substantial reinforcements to their Avar allies for fear of the Byzantine
ravaging their homeland.24 Even without the Persians, the siege was desperate. It was the
first siege the great city had ever undergone.
Fortunately, Heraclius’ faith in his subordinates was well placed. Bonus had taken
huge steps in ensuring the preparedness of his defenses on both the land and sea walls.
Even with the defenses at their peak, the men defending them would be hard pressed to
stop the Avar troops, numbering at least 80,000.25 The siege continued for weeks with
Avar assaults on the land and sea walls. They were in succession beaten off successfully.
After a short parley between the Byzantine and the Avar-Persian envoys, the Avar khan,
in frustration from an unsuccessful diplomatic solution in which he was smarted,
launched a full scale assault by sea and land. The sea battle on the Bosphorous was a
disaster for the Avar-Persians as the Byzantine ships destroyed the Avar boats in
multitude. The assault on the walls fared no better and the siege was lifted. The Avars
were broken from by catastrophic defeat and never again challenged the Byzantines.
However, one of the great benefits of the siege was a new technology that would
revolutionize the Byzantine armies and then the rest of the world: stirrups.26 Though of
immense importance, this invention was incorporated into the Byzantine cavalry shortly
before Nineveh, though to only cataphract units, and by the Yarmouk most Greek
Byzantine cavalry units would possess this powerful tool. Fortunately, the enemies of
24 Nicephorus, Short History, ed. Cyril Mango (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks, 1990), 97.
25 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. C. De Boor (Leipzig, 1883), 112.
26 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. C. De Boor (Leipzig, 1883),171.
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Byzantium did not have this mighty weapon as well and at Nineveh this would be
telling.27
By then the war had entered its twenty-fourth year and Heraclius sought a battle
that would end the destructive conflict and reclaim the lands which had been lost by
Phocas and by himself earlier in his reign. In Constantinople during the winter of 626/27,
Heraclius planned a new campaign, enlarged his army, and sought the most unlikely of
allies. Heraclius, in a show of great diplomacy, sought the aid of the Turks and Khazars
as allies with whom he could smash the Sassanids in the field. Heraclius was ready to
begin the last campaign, for if he failed there would be no retreat.28
Towards the end of the fall Heraclius struck into the northern Persian territory and
achieved great successes. Heraclius’ use of Turkish troops eventually fell by the wayside
in the end as the vast majority of Turks and Khazars left with Heraclius’ blessing after the
crucial victory in Caucasus Albania, not Balkan Albania.29 Heraclius would carry on the
campaign with his native Byzantine troops and other longtime allies, such as Armenians
and Huns. After the departure of the Turks, the Persians and many on Heraclius staff
assumed the Emperor would settle down into his winter quarters for the season. This was
traditional for most armies and continued even into the nineteenth century. Heraclius,
unpredictable as usual, chose to attack when his foes assumed he would remain
encamped.30 It was a genius offensive that could achieve victory incomparable or a
disaster immeasurable. Chosroes, realizing that the war had carried into his heartland,
27 Warren Treadgold, Byzantium and Its Army: 284-1081, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995),
76.
28 Geoffrey Regan, First Crusader: Byzantium’s Holy Wars, (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2001), 78.
29 Andreas Stratos, Byzantium in the Seventh Century. vol. 1, 602-634, trans. Marc Ogilvie-Grant
(Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1968), 152.
30 C. Cornuelle, An Overview of the Sassanian Persian Military, (London: Slingshot, 1997), 178.
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dispatched Shahrvaraz and Rahzadh to counter the Byzantines with a force most likely
two to one in the Persians’ favor.31 The Battle of Nineveh would be forced upon
Heraclius by the Persians to prevent Heraclius from driving further down into the
Sassanid Empire and Heraclius would require all his brilliance and abilities to win.
Shortly before Heraclius reached Nineveh, Rahzadh sent out a reconnaissance
force to reconnoiter the army of Heraclius. Unfortunately for the Persians, this group was
ambushed, its captain’s head spitted upon a pike, and a key prisoner taken. The prisoner
was most likely the captain’s squire who, through bravado or fear, informed Heraclius of
the Persian army’s positions and of a further three thousand heavy cavalry who would
soon reinforce the Sassanids. Recognizing the value of the information he possessed,
Heraclius sought to exploit the situation.32
Drawing up his forces in his traditional three line divisions, Heraclius found a
spot that was most favorable to him. Unfortunately, Heraclius could no longer rely on the
mobile retreat-regroup tactics that enabled most of his earlier victories.33 Victory was not
certain and Heraclius recognized Sassanid tactics even before the battle began. Rahzadh
and Shahrvaraz would need to wage a battle of attrition against the battle-hardened but
numerically inferior Byzantines. Wave after wave of Persian troops would need to wear
out the Byzantines and destroy them. Heraclius and the Persian commanders realized that
the cost of victory would be high but each recognized that their empires were at risk.34
31 Warren Treadgold, Byzantium and Its Army: 284-1081, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995),
103.
32 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. C. De Boor (Leipzig, 1883), 175.
33 Warren Treadgold, Byzantium and Its Army: 284-1081, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995),
102.
34 C. Cornuelle, An Overview of the Sassanian Persian Military, (London: Slingshot, 1997),185.
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The situation might not have been the key for a Byzantine victory but Heraclius could not
retreat from so deep in Sassanid territory.
On 12 December 627 the last great battle of antiquity commenced near the ancient
city of Nineveh. On one side were the battle-tested Byzantines who lacked the numbers
in both infantry and heavy cavalry but possessed the edge in quality of troops. The
Byzantine numbered roughly in the range of 20,000 troops. The majority of these were
the reliable infantry, with perhaps 3-4,000 troops being the precious cavalry that
Heraclius would rely on for final victory. 35The Sassanids’ heavy cavalry now had the
chance to engage in a full charge against the Byzantines. However, their infantry was a
mix of highly trained and experienced warriors, some fairly good garrison troops, and
throngs of inexperienced light infantry equipped with probably no more than a spear and
a wicker shield. The number of Persian troops is a more contested number but most likely
numbered 30-35,000 men. It is likely that a high portion of these troops were the heavy
cataphracts. 36
The Persian cavalry possessed a preponderance of heavy cataphract (Greek for
covered over) types along with some light units. The term cataphract was the overall
term for the types of cavalry, though the types of cataphract were specialized: the elite
cataphractii and clibinarii. Both types of soldiers wore armor from head to foot that was
similar to fish scales on their leather surcoats.37 Similarly armored were the horses. These
horses came from the legendary Nesaean studs prized for almost a thousand years as the
royal horses of the Persian rulers. Bred for size and speed the horses came from the
35 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. C. De Boor (Leipzig, 1883), 172.
36 C. Cornuelle, An Overview of the Sassanian Persian Military, (London: Slingshot, 1997),187.
37 C.W.C. Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages: A.D. 378-1515, (London: Oxford University Press,
1885. Reprint, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1953), 32.
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Persian province of Media.38 There were also units of cataphract camel cavalry. The
advantage of the camels was not a negligible one as horses fear the stench of camels and
would be more likely to run from the foul smelling beasts, but camels were also more
likely to panic in comparison to horses if a prolonged melee ensued.39
Each type of cataphract cavalry had a specific purpose. The cataphractii were
intended for one great sweeping armored charge that would shatter any formation. The
only drawback to the Sassanid cataphractii was their lack of stirrups, something the
Byzantines used in their cavalry formations.40 If the cavalryman ever slowed down or
stopped and had to engage in drawn out hand-to-hand combat then he was at the
disadvantage. His sheer weight entailed clumsiness and ease for unsaddling in battle.41
His primary weapon was a lance and would be worthless in a melee. On the other hand,
the clibinarii intentionally sought close combat and prolonged melees. These horsemen
were equipped with heavy maces suitable for crushing an opponent’s armor or skull. A
charge was not necessary and the rider and his horse would serve rather as a way to
hammer through the enemy than sweep them. His bulk was still a disadvantage but the
armor also served to protect him and his horse in the close combat. Unfortunately, all that
armor could also bake the horseman in the summer sun.
The light cavalry consisted of horse archers with little or no armor and
lightweight pursuit riders on light and fast horses. The horse archers were able to sting at
will and weaken formations of the enemy with volleys of arrow fire.42 The pursuit
38 Robert O’Connell, Soul of the Sword: An Illustrated History of Weaponry and Warfare from Prehistory
to the Present, (New York: The Free Press, 2002), 62.
39 C.W.C. Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages: A.D. 378-1515, (London: Oxford University Press,
1885. Reprint, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1953), 36.
40 ibid. 31.
41 C. Cornuelle, An Overview of the Sassanian Persian Military, (London: Slingshot, 1997),112.
42 C. Cornuelle, An Overview of the Sassanian Persian Military, (London: Slingshot, 1997),114.
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horsemen’s primary purpose was to ride down enemy skirmishers and keep pressure on
retreating troops.43 Neither group could engage medium and heavy infantry or likewise
armed cavalry. To have done so would have been suicidal and wasteful.
The Sassanid infantry was, in most cases, a rag-tag collection of poorly armed
men. The troops were a polyglot force of men from Kurdistan, Media, and other desert
locales who would retreat if placed in a desperate situation in battle. These men served
under a compulsive levy and were chained together at the beginning of battle.44 The
exceptions to these were the Sughdian infantry. Well armed and well disciplined, metallic
armor covered them in only the vital places and hardened linen armor in the remainder of
their outfit. The Sughdians trained and lived in the capital at Ctesiphon. Despite the
Spartan discipline enforced upon them, the Sughdians lived well and received pay
commensurate to that of the nobility. The Sughdians would hopefully be the key to
breaking the Byzantine infantry line and securing victory.45 In addition the Sassanids
possessed a large number of infantry archers who would soften up the Byzantine infantry
before the charge.46
The Byzantine cavalry was far more flexible in its employment. The Byzantines
also possessed cataphract cavalry, but in far lesser numbers as these could hinder
deployment in the mountainous regions. The Byzantine cataphractii would eventually
prove invaluable in the battle.47 The vast majority of their cavalry were the fast moving
byzantinoi. Well-armored with chain mail, instead of the plate type, the byzantinoi could
43 ibid.,110.
44 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. C. De Boor (Leipzig, 1883), 176.
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47 Maurice, Maurice’s Strategikon; Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy, trans. George T. Dennis
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engage medium cavalry with ease but possessed the speed to catch light units if needed.
The byzantinoi were equipped with sword and compound bow of the eastern variety and
enjoyed the ability to fight and break off effectively. The byzantinoi were often troops
who possessed an affinity for the saddle already and large numbers of Huns, Slavs,
Heruli, and Goths served in the byzantinoi.48 The other units, which the Byzantine could
use quite effectively, were the similarly equipped lancers. The lancers, armored like the
byzantinoi but able to engage heavy cavalry and then break off quickly, could outrace
their foes and return for an attack.49 This ability was the result of the lancers possessing a
lance capable of killing their heavily armored foes. If, for example, they engaged with a
Sassanid cataphract unit the lancers would charge, kill as many cataphracts before the
lancers were swamped by the heavier cataphracts and fall back with speed enough to
outrace their lumbering opponents. The cavalry of Byzantium would serve as the mobile
spear tip of any Byzantine Army.
If the Byzantine cavalry was the sword of the army, the infantry served as the
shield with which an enemy would dull its capabilities and ensure that the enemy
remained tied down in battle, unable to ever have a full advantage on the field of battle.
The standard, basic infantry of the Byzantine army were the heirs to Roman tradition of
disciplined, well-led, fighting maniples that would hold steadfast to a line of battle.50
Maniples were groups of infantry that were shaped in rectangular or square formations
that would move as one solid body instead of a mob. In a maniple there was mobility for
the attack and defense. However, they were not terribly loosened like their opponents
48ibid., 49.
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who mostly fought in large slack groups. There were differences, however, between the
units of the Roman world and its successor. The sword was no longer a Spanish model
short gladius. Instead it was a thicker and longer blade very similar to the swords that
would be used by the Franks of Western Europe. The sword could effectively stab and
slash at opponents as necessary. The shield was also smaller and more compact, with a
metallic boss covering the wielders hand. Nor did the infantry carry throwing spears or
pila.51 The armor of the troops was no longer the lorica segmenta of Trajan and
Hadrian’s day. Chain mail had replaced that thicker, more constricting armor.52 These
men were reliable and would not break easily before any force thanks to their training,
tactics, and the leadership of their officers and sergeants. The only weakness possessed
by the infantry was their vulnerability to heavy cavalry. This was particularly so in a full
fledged charge, where the heavy cavalry would crush upon the hapless troops on the
ground.
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CHAPTER III
THE LAST BATTLE OF THE ANCIENT WORLD
Heraclius knew his troops and he knew the troops of the enemy as well. It would
take a great general to withstand the combined forces of the Persians. The Sassanids’
greatest weakness, though, lay in the scornful attitude they possessed for their line
infantry. Even the crack Sughdians had little regard given to them by the cavalry of the
Sassanid nobility.53 It was to prove the downfall of the Sassanid battle plan. Most
importantly, Heraclius knew this weakness well.
The Byzantine front line was composed of three lines which would give Heraclius
the depth and mobility he required to fight this battle of attrition. The first line was his
infantry corp. The infantry would serve as the anvil on which the Persian hammer would
break. The second line had infantry in the center with Byzantinoi on the wings and
lancers spaced between. Their purpose was to plug gaps that would appear if the Persians
succeeded in breaking through.54 The last line was the remaining cavalry of the
Byzantines which would serve as the shock troops in case the Persian cavalry broke the
first two lines and were on the verge of separating the splitting Byzantine army. This line
had the contingent of Byzantine cataphractii which also served as Heraclius’
bodyguard.55
The Persian nobles, who possessed such martial vanity, would spell the ruin of
their army, drew up their troops in lines several units deep. The contempt of the Persians
53 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. C. De Boor (Leipzig, 1883), 183.
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for their infantry played out in that their first line was their heavy cavalry. The cataphract
units would serve to break the Byzantine lines on the first charge. This was not the
designs of either Shahrvaraz or Rahzadh; instead the Sassanid nobles possessed the
leeway granted by Chosroes to assert their baronial and lordly claims over the generals
who outranked them in the military hierarchy but not in the social hierarchy. This
practice was not uncommon, even in later centuries feudal lords would assert their
inexperienced and rash command abilities over their most experienced generals56 This
folly on the part of the nobles and the battle formations drawn up by them would serve to
negate whatever plans the Persian generals, Shahrvaraz or Rahzadh, had for a victory that
would not be an utter bloodbath. The infantry of the Sassanids were drawn up behind in
ranks several files deep. The crack Sughdians would be near the middle to act as the
troops which would hopefully attack at the right moment and serve as the breaking point
for the Byzantines.57
The morning of the twelfth of December was an unusually foggy and wet one in
the mountainous region of northern modern day Iraq.58 The weather became an ally of the
Byzantines that day. The normally dry desert air would have kept the Sassanid bows
intact but the rains had weakened the binding of those compound bows. The bows of the
Sassanids were composed of numerous layers of wood and bone and glue that were
incredibly effective at piercing armor. However, one moistened the glue had a tendency
of coming undone and thusly the bow as well.59 For the Byzantines, their Hunnic and
native Romano-Greeks compound bows did not suffer terribly from the rain and would
56 Geoffrey Regan, First Crusader: Byzantium’s Holy Wars, (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2001), 112.
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prove decisive. The bows of the Byzantine in contrast were built often from one piece of
wood such as ash. While not as effective at armor piercing as the Sassanid bows these
bows would not suffer if wet.60 The ground also was soft enough to slow the progress of
the Persian heavy cavalry.61
In the misty morning fog the Persian heavy cavalry made its charge into the
Byzantine lines. The thunderous approach of the Sassanid cavalry was unmistakable in
the dawn and Heraclius and his bodyguard rode to the frontlines of the infantry to
galvanize their courage.62 His proximity to the front ranks would be one of the most
fortuitous events of the battle, as he would serve as a living banner for the courage of his
men. When the Sassanid cataphractii were within two hundred yards of the lines, the
Byzantine archers and byzantinoi opened fire. Normally these distances would have been
a quick ride by the cataphract. Fortunately, the softened ground slowed the horses pace.
At least six volleys of arrows, by most estimates to be 12,000, flew into the iron-plated
horsemen and weakened their ranks.63 But the crush of the Persian heavy cavalry was
severe. At least one hundred Byzantine infantrymen were smashed in the initial onrush.64
The battle had commenced and Heraclius responded quickly to the Sassanid
cataphracts. Swinging his lancers to both flanks of the Persian cavalry, Heraclius and his
cataphractii bodyguards entered the fray. The lancers, in only a few minutes, had left
their positions in the second line and dashed hard around to begin slaughtering the
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Persian cavalry.65 The infantry, with renewed morale as their emperor was with them,
began tearing the Persians, lacking stirrups, out of their saddles. The Byzantines, seeking
revenge on the Persians, took no prisoners among the cataphractii and clibinarii. The
cataphractii with their momentum spent were easy prey. The clibinarii were a more
difficult task. For this the lancers needed to slay the clibinarii with their long lances. Yet
a problem remained with the camel cataphracts which were largely clibinarii. It was up
to the infantry to destroy this force and likewise suffered heavy losses.66 The camels
could not be attacked by the horse mounted troops of Heraclius, due to their fear of
camels, and the infantry would have to get in close to kill the rider. A task the
infantryman would have to accomplish amidst the crush of battle while dodging the
heavy mace of the clibinarii. In essence, the task of destroying a modern tank with a
satchel full of grenades would have been easier. For the better part of twenty minutes the
cavalry-infantry duel continued with acts of Byzantine heroism that were worthy of
medals in any century. Heraclius himself slew three Persian noblemen in the fray. It is
noteworthy that these noblemen, all young men, were slain by Heraclius who was
considered elderly at fifty-one.67
The Persian generals watched as their cavalry charge proved a disaster and
recognized that a bloody day lay ahead. Both, however, recognized that that most of the
heady and vain Persian nobles were slain and now without hindrance they could send
their troops in for the kill. Shahrvaraz and Rahzadh committed their infantry and archers
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to the battle that raged a half-mile away.68 While the Persian infantry marched forward
the remaining cataphract troops retreated to their original positions. Leaderless and
demoralized, but thirsting for revenge, the remaining cataphract were saved for a
possible coup-de-grace.69
The Persian infantry was to fare better due to their courage and fear of their
masters’ whips. When the Persians came within range of the Byzantine archers and
byzantinoi, they suffered terrific losses, yet they pressed forward. It was not until the
Persian archers reached one hundred yards that they could open fire. Even then, the strain
that the Persians placed on their bows to fire often found their weapons snapping in
half.70 Still the infantry continued forward. The Byzantines, exhausted by the cavalry
battle, prepared for the lines of infantry that would surge forward unto them. When the
clash came it was similar to water smashing on rock. But the Byzantines fell back. The
Kurds, fighting in their homeland, put up a tough assault against the Byzantines. The
Kurds, fierce fighters skilled with a heavy spear, began to make headways.71 At this point
the first third of the Persian infantry had engaged the Byzantine line. Heraclius though
hesitated to throw in his precious cavalry until all the Persian infantry was in line.
The elite Sughdians now entered the fray and the battle reached its climax. The
Emperor recognized the threat these Sughdians possessed and committed the rest of his
infantry to the fight.72 The Sughdians and Kurds began to find the breaking points in the
Byzantine infantry and surged forward. At this point, Heraclius committed, not his
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cavalry, but his armored archers from the province of Trebizond. The blows of swords,
axes, spears, and shield bosses rang across the battlefield in thunderous roars. For hours
this continued, well into the afternoon. The Byzantine infantry, in a near crescent
formation, was almost stretched to the breaking point, yet still held on long enough.73
Heraclius at last threw in his byzantinoi, lancers and cataphractii into the flanks
of the Persian infantry and the battle played out into its last and deadliest phase. The
Persian generals, Shahrvaraz and Rahzadh, recognized the threat and committed
themselves, their bodyguards, and the rallied Persian heavy cavalry to the battle.74 The
battle had reached its height and both sides recognized that all was at stake. For the
Byzantines, defeat would mean death and slavery in a land far from home. For the
Persians defeat would mean the end of their empire, or at least its permanent crippling.75
Finally the Persian cavalry retreated after Heraclius slew Rahzadh in the heat of
battle. The Sughdians had reached their breaking point and began surrendering in what
was now a futile battle. Heraclius, realizing that the elite Persian infantry was shattered,
called for the surrender of the rest of the Persian army.76 The Persians began surrendering
in droves. The battle of Nineveh, desperate by any standards, was finally over.
It was already nightfall when the battle ended and both sides hoped to save their
wounded and count and bury their dead. Losses were nearly impossible to quantify but
deaths among senior commanders, especially amongst the Persians, was catastrophic.77
The Persians had slain several senior Byzantine officers. Heraclius, had taken several
wounds, but none was severe. Byzantine casualties numbered most likely one fifth of
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their army, with the infantry taking the majority of the losses. The Byzantines had
slaughtered most of the Persian nobility, but enough remained to lead an organized retreat
and set up an honor guard on the edge of the battlefield to honor the dead.78 Persian
losses were monumentally high. At least six thousand Persians were taken prisoner and
most likely another eight thousand to ten thousand lay dead on the field.79 For the
Persians, their wounded were to have no respite as many died during the night of wounds
that were probably superficial if immediate treatment had been given to the wounded and
the cold killed many more.80
Historians will find many comparisons between this battle and one fought eight
centuries later in northern France on a field called Agincourt. In point of fact, Nineveh
could be easily considered the “Byzantine Agincourt.” One army, massively
outnumbered, characterized both battles. At Agincourt, even by the most conservative
estimates, Henry V was outnumbered at least three to one. The vaunted Persian and
French cavalry insisted on leading a vain charge into a defensive line on a wet day. Both
cavalry charges produced losses that were soaring. The English and Byzantine armies
were both far from home and led by a warrior king. Byzantine and English archers
proved to be a decisive factor in battle. Losses amongst the French and Persian armies
were disastrously high. And those losses included vast amounts of nobility. Above all
though, Agincourt and Nineveh were tremendous victories that at the time seemed
decisive but proved to be short lived. 81 For the English this was due to the premature
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death of Henry V and the gradual reconquest of French territories by a revived French
army. For the Byzantines the reversal would be the whirlwind of Islam.
28
CHAPTER IV 
 
AFTER NINEVEH AND THE RISE OF ISLAM
After the battle Heraclius prayed to God and the Virgin for the great victory they
bestowed upon him and his army. He then chose not to execute his prisoners in the hope
of drawing Persian support to him. Not only was the victory great in scope but the booty
seized was immense. Theophanes recorded hundreds of gold swords, bracelets, belts,
breastplates, and shields seized. The shield of Rahzadh himself was solid gold and
possessed at least 120 different laminae, beautifully carved gems placed in a decorative
pattern, upon it.82
Heraclius was now free to press southward to the capital at Ctesiphon. However,
while the ferocity of Persian resistance grew slightly, no major force blacked Heraclius as
no Sassanid leadership was forthcoming. Chosroes II upon hearing of the defeat at
Nineveh lost his last vestiges of sanity and the nation was temporarily leaderless.83 In the
path of conquest to Ctesiphon, Heraclius took numerous palaces of the Sassanid court. At
the River Diyala, Heraclius captured the palace known as the “Paradise of Beklal.” Here
the Byzantine troops discovered thousands of deer, zebras, and ostriches. The feast that
ensued was the first time the troops ate well in many months.84
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Along the same river, Heraclius captured the fortified palatial city of Dastagerd.
Dastagerd had been the home of the Sassanid royal palace for over a century and its
capture proved to be one of the greatest prizes in the history of warfare. Here remained
the vast Sassanid treasury only some of which Chosroes had been able to take with him,
only weeks before.85 Thousands of Christian slaves were liberated from the surrounding
area from the Persians and their incursions from the past decades. The freed Christians
called him a new Moses.86 But in retrospect history proved that this was to be the final
episode of the thousand year struggle between the Greco-Romans and the Persians and
the prizes taken from Dastagerd would be indicative of this. In the palace the Byzantines
found the Roman standards from the battle of Carrhae six centuries previous. They also
discovered the standards from the Roman defeat at Edessa in 260 A.D. And like
Alexander did eight centuries previously at Persepolis, Heraclius torched the great palace
in revenge and for God.87
Heraclius pressed on to Ctesiphon hoping to achieve a triumph that would rival
Caesar, Constantine, or Alexander. Instead events inside the palace at Ctesiphon would
ensure that a full conquest would not be necessary. Kavad, Chosroes’ eldest son,
overthrew him in a palace coup. Chosroes, imprisoned, had to beg for his food from his
jailers. His former generals and governors came to insult him to his face. Finally, Kavad
forced Chosroes to watch the murder of his many sons by his many concubines. Kavad
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then ordered Chosroes shot to death slowly with numerous arrows, while Kavad
watched.88
Heraclius made overtures for a Persian surrender and Kavad welcomed them, for
his empire lay in ruin. The war was pointless to continue. The terms of the Persian
surrender were generous. Heraclius demanded the release of all Byzantine prisoners, the
return of all Byzantine territory conquered by the Sassanids in the war, and the return of
the True Cross.89 When the Persian ambassadors went to Heraclius who was camped
north of Ctesiphon at Ganzak, they saw the ruin that Heraclius had inflicted upon the
Sassanid states. Along the road between Ctesiphon and Ganzak lay the bodies of at least
three thousand Persian troops. The great palaces were in ruins. If Heraclius was a harsh
conqueror it was a small thing compared to the ruination the Persians had inflicted upon
the Romans and Byzantines.
History records that Heraclius fought with the tactical skill of Hannibal and the
strategic foresight of Caesar. He rebuilt a shattered army and made it the best in the entire
world. Later on, men such as Napoleon, Sherman, Guderian, Rommel, and Schwarzkopf
would repeat his strategy of wearing out the enemy by eating into the rear areas. His
ability to lead his army on a brutal war of retreat, attack, and counterattack is
unquestionable. Nineveh, the exception to this strategy, ironically remains his greatest
victory. His army did not know defeat, only setbacks. And he ended victoriously the last
war of the Classical World for an empire that stood as the bastion of Christianity.
Peace had finally come and the Byzantine army withdrew from Persian territory
to restore the lands retaken from the Sassanids. Heraclius retired to Constantinople to
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rebuild his shattered empire. The destiny of the Byzantine Empire seemed now secure for
all time, and Heraclius to be the greatest emperor Christianity had ever possessed.
Regrettably, none of it was to be. The hero of Nineveh, a front line soldier, a man whom
his people would adore, did not die at the age of fifty-five in the throes of victory. Instead
he would live to see the empire he saved shattered by a force no man could have
envisioned.
Like a fire from Arabia, Islam sprang forth onto the world stage and changed the
face of history. The story of Islam is one that has been written countless times and needs
to be recalled here only briefly. Muhammad of Mecca, a merchant who could expect a
life of prosperity and comfort, began receiving divine revelations from Allah at the age of
forty in 610 A.D. After a period of fear and doubt Muhammad began preaching, what he
insisted was not a new religion but one that purified the way of the old Judeo-Christian
monotheism. He was soon to face a persecution common to those who challenge the old
ways. In 622 A.D. Muhammad and his followers fled to Medina, north of Mecca, to
escape said persecution. This migration is known as the Hijra and it also marks the
beginning of the Muslim calendar. During his time in Medina Muhammad consolidated
his base of power and began his raids on Meccan caravans.90 In Arabic these attacks are
called the ghazawat, and ultimately they resulted in the return of Muhammad to Mecca
and the triumph of Islam in Arabia. After several battles with the Meccans, which
included the miraculous victory at Badr, Muhammad was finally able to take the city of
Mecca without a fight in 630. By the time of Muhammad’s death in 632, the entire
90 Kaegi, Walter. Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests. (New York, Cambridge Press. 1992), 32.
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Arabian Peninsula was under the sway of Islam, though Jews and Christians were still
allowed to live and worship relatively freely in those places. 91
After the death of Muhammad the caliphs who followed him, known as the
Rashidun or Rightly Guided, began to encroach ever further into Palestine and
Mesopotamia with their highly mobile mounted forces and lightly armored desert
infantry. Initially these movements were probing actions designed to test the weaknesses
of the Sassanid and Byzantine Empire. However, discovering that these areas were
deprived of defenders the armies Islam went on a rampage of conquest. More importantly
many Byzantine cities began welcoming the Muslims as liberators from the theocratic
tyranny of the Byzantines upon their Coptic and Syriac subjects.
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CHAPTER V
COMPOSITION OF BYZANTINE AND MUSLIM ARMIES
The army of the Arab Muslims was very much the polar opposite of the Byzantine
forces against whom they would fight. It possessed the light infantry that was
characteristic of eastern troops. However, this infantry, unlike that of the Sassanids, was
not a demoralized and conscripted force of polyglot infantry. The Sassanid infantry, with
the exception of the Sughdians, were farmers and farriers who were expected to fight and
die. In another age they would have been considered perfect cannon fodder. The Arab
Muslims were not that, though farmers and merchants they may have been.
The clan style of warfare in the Arabian Peninsula invariably bred men who had
tasted combat or at least were familiar with weaponry. Much like the Scottish clans, the
Arabs often possessed blood ties to those who fought alongside them and thus their
courage was bolstered to near fearlessness.92 In addition to this already fearsome skill and
determination was the strength of Islam itself. As for the Arab soldiers themselves, the
Muslim troops were well suited to desert and other harsh terrains. Their armor and
weaponry was not however, of as high a quality as the Byzantines’. In a one-to-one fight
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like Nineveh this would be telling.93 However, the Battle of the Yarmouk River was not
destined to be this type of battle, and because the Byzantines would be lacking their
emperor it would be a fight that they would ultimately lose. 94
Arab cavalry was in many essences the ultimate in light cavalry, though they did
not possesses the composite bow that was used among the cavalry of the east or the
compound bow favored by the barbarians that laid low the Western Roman Empire.
Lacking in bows however, they did enjoy the indomitable will that their brethren on the
ground likewise possessed and would ensure that they could charge into hurricane of
arrows before the broke. In addition the Arabs had some of the finest horses in the world.
A treatise could be written on these magnificent animals. Even today, Arabian horse
bloodlines are traced back to the days of the Prophet Muhammad. The horse itself is not
the massive battle steed favored by the medieval knights of Europe such as the horses
bred in Normandy and Flanders. Nor is it like the speedy draft Nesaean studs favored by
the Sassanids.95 Instead it is a “hot-blooded horse” that is perfect for speed and stamina.
In addition the Arabian is a highly intelligent and sensitive animal that is responsive to its
rider and makes a superb light and medium cavalry horse. The Arabs would use their
speed and mounted discipline to full effect against the larger and more experienced
Byzantine cavalry. 96
When it came to tactics the Muslims were inexperienced but not necessarily at a
disadvantage thereby. The Muslims were used to open battles that would allow for the
destruction of a large portion of the enemy army when victory was achieved. The usual
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tactics would be the simple lines drawn en masse across a battlefield. This would be
followed with numerous champions fighting individual duels that would serve to bolster
the victor and weaken the morale of the defeated. After this was normally a coordinated
charge against the enemy lines, and the victory usually going to the attacker, as they
possessed the momentum from the charge. The tactics in this case dictated the strategy
that open battles were to be sought against foes in preference to lengthy sieges. In battles
such as Ajnadayn and the Yarmouk, which will be addressed, this strategy favored the
Muslims.97
As a polar opposite were the Byzantines whose tactics were dictated by their
strategy. The Byzantines tactics were the result of Heraclius’ victories against the
Sassanids and the work by Maurice as expounded in his Strategikon. However, these
were problematic. Heraclius’ victories were the result of years of conditioning and
familiarization with Persian tactics in the face of victory and defeat. The Strategikon was
an excellent work that included numerous ethnographic studies of Byzantium’s known
enemies such as the Turks, Sassanids, Avars, Bulgars, etc.98 It did not include the wild
Muslims driven by faith and with a speed that was nearly unmatchable. However, it did
possess one factor that was easily seen in Heraclius’ campaigns against the Sassanids:
combined-arms strategy. The united use of cavalry, infantry, and skirmishers proved to
be of monumental importance to the victories achieved against a numerically and
sometimes qualitatively superior enemy. However, this was a difficult task to accomplish
and only the most experienced, bold, somewhat rash, and cagiest of generals of any army
throughout history could use it effectively. Heraclius was one of those men.
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Unfortunately there weren’t any other generals in that part of the world, Muslim or
Byzantine, who could have succeeded in such complex maneuvers. 99
99 Geoffrey Regan, First Crusader: Byzantium’s Holy Wars, (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2001.) 58.
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CHAPTER VI
CLASH AT THE YARMOUK RIVER
After several deep incursions by the Arabs into Palestine and Syria, Heraclius
decided once and for all to raise a force that would check a major invasion and send the
Muslims reeling. Conversely, the Muslims would seek to take Damascus as a launching
point for future conquests of Byzantine lands. For both sides Damascus was a strategic
point for ensuring the safety of their empires. The strategic importance of Damascus
would result in the first serious clash of arms in Syria. The Battle of Ajnadayn, occurring
in July of 634, was not the opening move of the Arab-Byzantine Wars but it set in motion
the course of events that would eventually led to the great Muslim conquests that would
devour the Levant, North Africa, and the rest of the Middle East. 100
Though the battle is sketchy and drawn largely from Muslim sources enough can
be pieced together to determine its course and result. At Ajnadayn, at which Heraclius
was not present as he felt the Muslims were a force that could be reckoned with easily,
the Muslims under Khalid ibn al-Walid marched to meet the Byzantines in the open
field.101 It was a wise choice as the cities that had already fallen to the Arabs were not
strategically important. In this case an open battle was far preferable to the mobile
Muslims, who knew that in the case of a siege with which they were evenly opposed the
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Muslims would ultimately fail. It was this strategy, that of seeking open battle rather
than siege, that ensured the Muslims’ final victory.102
The Muslim advance on Ajnadayn was indeed the correct move as a large
Byzantine army was marshalling there and was preparing to drive the Muslims out city
by city. However, to concentrate their forces took the Muslims two weeks; the
Byzantines, without Heraclius’s leadership, took almost a month. Once the armies had
maneuvered to a point where conflict was inevitable, the Byzantines drew first blood in
their opening foray. Initially the Byzantines sent forth their skirmishing slingers and
archers. This would serve to not only kill large numbers of the enemy Muslims but also
lower their morale. Despite the voluminous fire and heavy causalities the Muslims held
firm and did not return volleys as their archers were incapable of the range and volume of
archer fire. It was here that the Byzantines threw away their best chance of victory and
failed to launch an all-out assault on the Muslims.103 After the initial skirmishing phase,
which left huge gaps in the Muslim lines, Khalid ibn al-Walid altered his strategy.104
In this battle it was the Byzantine commanders who had the greater tactical and
strategic expertise; thusly al-Walid chose to weaken the Byzantines using their own
vanity as a weapon. The Muslims’ individual champions would march out to the fore and
challenge the Byzantine officers to single combat. Unfortunately for the Byzantines, this
ploy worked. Scores of experienced Byzantine officers were killed by the more martial
and battle-tested Muslim officers. One of the more notable occurrences was the story of
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Zarrar Ibn al-Azwar. Zarrar’s common nom de guerre was "the half naked warrior"
because he often fought with out his shirt and armor, however during the lull for the
champions he advanced forward in full armor and an elephant hide shield taken from a
dead Byzantine. His challenge to the Byzantine champions for a duel was his famed
battle cry, “I am the death of the Pale Faces, I am the killer of Romans, I am the scourge
sent upon you, I am Zarrar Ibn al Azwar.” 105Immediately after this he shed his robes and
dropped his shield. Numerous Byzantine officers came out to slay the fierce captain but
instead they found themselves dead upon the Muslims sword. Followed by these
disgraces the Byzantines sent forth several more champions to duel their opposite
numbers amongst the Muslims. By the end of the duels al-Walid realized he had achieved
the advantage by slaying a high proportion of Byzantine officers for minimal officer
losses on his side. 106
At this point the effectiveness of the Byzantine army was thoroughly depleted and
al-Walid launched an all-out assault. Al-Walid discovered though, that the Byzantines
would be a tougher opponent than he expected as they held their ground despite the
losses amongst their officer corps. By the end of the day no one had achieved a clear
advantage. On the second day the Byzantine commander, Theodorus, laid an ambush for
al-Walid which could have effectively ended the battle. However, the ambush backfired
as Theodorus was slain while trying to kill al-Walid himself. The Byzantines, realizing
their commander was dead, lost heart but nonetheless maintained the field.107 Al-Walid
sensed the shift in morale and sent out his last assault against the Byzantine positions.
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The Muslim troops charged forth and brutal and merciless combat ensued. Even without
leadership however, the Byzantine troops held firm against Muslim attacks. However
Khalid now committed his final reserves into the fray, desperate to end the long hours of
bloodshed of this prolonged battle.108 It was with this attack that the Byzantines broke,
but they retreated in relatively good order. 109
This could have been a pyrrhic victory for the Muslims as many of their senior
officers were killed in the final assaults. It was exceedingly bloody for both sides and
even to this day the ground is littered with markers for the dead. Even with the
Byzantines retreating in three different directions the battle was not completely over as
the remaining Muslim cavalry pursued the largest of the three Byzantine forces that
retreated in the direction of Jerusalem. The Byzantine losses were worse here than on the
battlefield and it proved to have grievous effects for the cities that were to soon suffer
sieges by the Muslims. Shortly thereafter the Muslims went on to laying sieges against
numerous cities in Palestine and Syria. While siege works were not the forte of the
Muslims, their forces proved to be far too numerous for the Byzantines to counterattack
or for those defending to withstand any particularly long or bloody sieges.110
It was to be another two years before the Byzantines or Muslim Arabs chose to
engage in open battle against each other. During those years numerous cities fell to the
Muslims. Some were the result of the Muslim siege works. Others, however, simply
opened their gates to the Muslims as liberators from the rule of Byzantium. These cities
fell largely as a result of the Monophysite-Orthodox Schism that had occurred in the
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previous century. It was a sad state of affairs for the Byzantine Empire and glorious
conquest for the Muslims. However, by 636 Heraclius had organized a large enough
force at Antioch with which he believed he could drive the Muslims out of Syrian and the
Levant permanently.111 All that was required was a battle that would ensure a finality for
the both the victor and the vanquished. Heraclius knew that this was the weapon with
which he would crush Islam and regain his lost territories.112
Upon learning that a large host was arrayed against them, the Muslim forces
under al-Walid and numerous other commanders decided to withdraw from the cities,
leaving only token defenses in place. For the first time the Muslims chose not engage
immediately and decided that a tactical withdrawal would be the wisest move. This
served several purposes as it extended the Byzantine supply lines and made their army all
the more vulnerable as they moved deeper into Syria; it also ensured that unless the
Byzantines moved around the Muslim army, the Muslims would be able to fight on
grounds of their choosing. Lastly, if they suffered a defeat that was not a complete
catastrophe the Muslims could retreat into the deserts of Arabia. For several weeks this
parrying of foes continued until Heraclius realized that peaceful negotiations were an
impossibility. Heraclius, by now ill and at Antioch, gave orders for the Byzantine forces
to close in and destroy the Muslim army.113
The Byzantine force that was arrayed against the Muslims was a sizeable one that
some historians consider the largest to ever be assembled in the Levant up to that point.
Historians of that era, particularly Muslims, estimate the size of Heraclius’ army to be
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around 150,000 men under arms.114 Most historians in the past few decades, however,
have estimated the Byzantine Army to be less than fifty thousand with the number more
realistically being thirty thousand. The reason for this discrepancy is an obvious one as it
would serve Muslim propaganda well for the victors of the Battle of the Yarmouk River
to have triumphed against a foe that could have outnumbered them as much as five to
one. The Muslim forces at the battle were most likely in the range of 15-20,000. If this is
so then the forces arrayed against each other at the Yarmouk were comparable in size.115
In such a case it would be tactics that would win the day.
A preliminary action occurred in mid-July of 636 when the Ghassanid Arabs
engaged the screening forces for the Muslims.116 Not a battle in any real sense, it
nonetheless confirmed that the battle would be soon. On the morning of August 20, 636,
the two armies faced off against each other along the Yarmouk River, northeast of the
Sea of Galilee. Between the two opposing armies stretched the battlefield which
consisted of the Plain of the Yarmouk.117 This is enclosed on its western and southern
sides by deep ravines, known as Wadi-ur-Raqqad with the banks about 1,000 feet deep,
this ravine joins Yarmouk River on its southern side. Of the entire battlefield only one
position has any great strategic importance and it is the hill known as the Jamu’a or
Gathering. This hill allows a view of almost the entire field from an elevated position. 118
Beyond size the composition of the armies should be examined so that the quality
of the forces can be compared. The Byzantine army consisted of five corps of infantry
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and cavalry that varied in quality and ethnicity. Not only in this army were the citizens of
the Byzantine Empire but numerous other factions from afar, including men from the
Italian Peninsula. These were the most reliable and battle-experienced of the units as
many of these men had fought under Heraclius during the Persian Wars, culminating in
the victory at Nineveh. These men would constitute the bulk of the heavy infantry and
cavalry that were of superior quality to anything the Muslims could throw at them.119
This also included a large group of other Europeans that included Franks and Spaniards.
These forces constituted two corps under the command of Byzantine generals Gregory
and Dairjan.120 Another corps of the army were the Russians from the area which would
in later centuries incorporate Novgorod. Most of these were not Russians in the
traditional sense, instead most were Scandinavian settlers of the area and had filtered into
the Byzantine army to serve as tough mercenaries. They were equipped largely with axes
or spears and simple wooden shields similar to their brethren in the far north.121
While these men were a relatively trustworthy force, the addition of Avar and
Bulgar Slavs to this corps would serve only to cause dissension and distrust in the army.
These peoples, who had recently only waged terrible wars against the Byzantines, were
by far the most unreliable and of the lowest quality. They went into battle usually armed
only with the most basic and crudest of weaponry and also wore little if any armor. These
men would serve as suitable troops for wearing out the better force, buying time with
their lives.122 These men were under the command of the Russian prince Qanateer. Under
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the command of their king Mahan, a massive corps of Armenians and Georgians from the
Caucasus would serve as the reserve if the battle went awry. These men were largely
untested conscripts peppered with a handful of veterans from the Persian Wars. While not
as well armed as the Greek troops, these men had better equipment than the Slavs and
were of more value than simply cannon fodder.123 Lastly the Christianized Ghassanid
Arabs, under the command of their king Jabla bin al-Eiham, would serve as the light
cavalry which would counter the Muslim cavalry similarly equipped.124 It was formidable
force that would take great skill and a good deal of luck to defeat.
The Muslim army was under the overall command of al-Walid, as he was the
most experienced of all the officers in the Muslim camp. In addition his victory over the
Byzantine force at Ajnadayn added to his battlefield prowess. The force that al-Walid
commanded was a polyglot of infantry and cavalry that had made the strategic
withdrawal from Palestine and Syria. Al-Walid after taking command reorganized the
army in to thirty-six infantry and four cavalry regiments, with cavalry making up a
quarter of the army. One large cavalry regiment would serve as the reserve corps.125 The
army was lined out over a front of eleven miles, with its left on the Yarmouk River a mile
before the ravine began and right on Jabiya road. The center of the army was under the
command of Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah to the left center and Shurhabeel bin Hassana to
the right center. The left wing was under the command of Yazeed and the right wing was
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under Amr ibn al-A’as’ command. Behind them stood the cavalry regiments which would
serve as fire brigades.126
The battle began with the similar calling out of champions, only in this case it
took a turn for the worse as a Byzantine general named George desired to speak to al-
Walid. According to sources on both sides, George converted to Islam after hearing al-
Walid’s moving speech on the virtues of Islam. George was destined to die later in the
day on the Muslims’ side.127 After this inauspicious start the true dueling of champions
began. By midday no one side had gained a clear advantage in the dueling, and Mahan
chose to engage the Muslims with a half-hearted assault to probe the Muslim line for
weaknesses. It was the first of many decisions that would come to doom the Byzantine
forces. The infantry that seemed on the verge of breaking through was not reinforced and
the fighting simply petered out by early evening with both sides taking mild losses.
Casualties were higher amongst the Byzantine forces, composed largely of the non-
European troops who were not seasoned veterans, unlike most of the Muslim infantry. 128
That evening Mahan chose to launch a major assault at dawn against the Muslim
lines, using surprise as his key element. His orders entailed that the main thrusts would
come from the wings of his army with the center holding the Muslims before them in
place so that reinforcements could not strengthen the flanks. To observe the course of the
battle Mahan set up a large pavilion surrounded by Armenian guards who were most
likely needed for the fighting.129 Though the attack at dawn achieved success, it was not a
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total surprise, as several outward posts had been set up by al-Walid for detecting just such
a movement. However, the speed with which the Byzantines attacked served to negate
most of this. At the center, the Byzantine did not force a major action as this was meant
to be a limited attack to hold the Muslim center in position. On the right wing of the
Byzantine a force commanded by Qanateer and was composed largely of Slavs attacked
and forced the Muslims to retreat due to sheer numbers. The Muslim infantry was driven
back and al-A’as ordered his cavalry to counterattack but they too were pushed back and
were driven towards their camp.130 After this humiliating retreat the Muslims reorganized
and rushed towards the battle-field to reorganize for the counter-attack.131
On the left the situation was almost as grim for the Muslims. Yazeed’s corps was
driven back and nearly broke due to the Greco-European troops, who not only were
mainly veterans but had also linked themselves at the ankles with chains. This was taken
as a blood oath before the battle so none could retreat, and the chains also served to break
up Muslim cavalry attacks.132 As both wings of the Muslim army seemed on the verge of
collapse, Mahan did not press his advantage as wisely as he should have and failed to
notice al-Walid bringing up his cavalry reserve. He first turned to the right wing and with
his fire brigade and one cavalry regiment struck at the flank of the army of Qanateer at
the same time as al-A’as counter-attacked again from the front. The forces under
Qanateer began a withdrawal toward their original positions, and thus the Muslim right
was stabilized. 133
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Al-Walid then withdrew his cavalry for a strike on the left where Yazeed’s corps
was about to make a counterattack. Al-Walid was cautious enough also to dispatch a
small cavalry force to ensure that the Byzantine center did not come to the aid of their
right flank. Slowly and surely the Muslim left was secured though at a far higher cost
than what it took to secure the right. During the fighting in the Byzantine center general
Dairjan was slain by the cavalry assault. It was serious blow to morale and his loss was
the highest of the day when the lines had returned to their original positions of that
morning. 134
The third day began with a Byzantine attack on the corps of Amr ibn al-A'as and
Sharhabeel bin Hasana, selecting the Muslim right again as the point for the main assault.
Initially the Muslim line held against the Slavs and Rus troops but the sheer weight of the
Byzantine forces proved telling and the Muslims were driven back further and further.
This time, though, the Muslim retreat did not continue all the way to their camp. All the
while the entire Byzantine center and right demonstrated to keep the main body of the
Muslim forces busy so as not to allow any reserves being committed. Al-Walid then
decided to concentrate his reserve cavalry on a flank attack to the Byzantine left.135 Like
the previous day, the Byzantine infantry was not capable of fending off attacks from all
three sides. Again the Slavic and Rus corps retreated but in good order and inflicting
heavy losses on the Muslims. But by nightfall the lines had returned again to their
original positions.136
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The fourth day proved to be the last chance the Byzantines had for a total victory
and a day in which casualties were enormous on both sides. Mahan’s plan was that the
two armies of Qanateer, the right wing and right half of the central corps- the Armenians
and Slavs and Rus- were to assault the corps of Amr and Sharhabeel. Amr was pushed
back again, but not as far as on the previous day for fear of facing the ire of the women in
the Muslim camp. The women, who normally served as field wives and etc, were angered
the previous day by the dishonorable retreat of their men and began to throw rocks and
curses at the Muslims to galvanize their courage through shame. 137The corps of Amr, a
good distance from their original positions, held the right wing against the Slavs and Rus
which led to intense fighting. However, the Armenians almost achieved a breakthrough
and pushed the Muslims back towards their camp. The Armenians, strongly supported by
the Ghassanid Christian Arabs, seemed on the verge of shattering the Muslim section of
the line. Knowing that he could not withdraw his reserve cavalry as the Byzantines had
not yet attacked his center and left, al-Walid ordered his troops to attack the Byzantine
lines to occupy the Byzantine right and center. With his cavalry now free, al-Walid struck
hard at the Armenian right followed by a counterstroke of Muslim cavalry to the
Armenian left. It proved to be too much for the Armenians and they withdrew in good
order. 138
With the dangerous Armenian near-breakthrough contained, al-Walid ordered his
cavalry and infantry to drive the Rus and Slavs back. Here too they succeeded in sending
Qanateer’s corps to its original position. However, a dangerous situation had developed
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on the Muslim left and center. In the midst of the assault on the Byzantine lines to keep
them occupied, the troops making the assault suffered horrific losses as a result of
Byzantine archery.139 In order for the Muslims to withdraw in good order from their
attack, a special corps of 400 volunteers took a death oath to hold the Byzantines back for
long enough. The suicidal act of Ikrimah’s regiment provided a cover for the retreated
corps. Of the 400 dedicated men who had taken the oath of death, everyone was either
killed or seriously wounded, but they accounted for many times their number of
Byzantines. Ikrimah and his son, Amr, were mortally wounded. By the end of the day,
they lines still had not moved and losses had reached a terrible culmination. 140
By the fifth day both sides were exhausted; however, the Byzantines had suffered
more and were ready to enter negotiations.141 An emissary from Mahan arrived in the
Muslim camp and offered a temporary truce. Al-Walid, sensing that the Byzantines were
nearly at the breaking point, did not parley with the Byzantine emissary and said, “We
are in a hurry to finish this business!” It was a definitive reply that ensured that it would
be a fight to the finish. Later in the day al-Walid organized his remaining cavalry force of
four thousand men into one massive attacking force. This force was positioned on the far
right of Muslim lines. 142
A sandstorm arose on the sixth day and thus the Byzantine commanders did not
reckon on an attack from the Muslims. It was a mistake that would cost them everything.
However, shortly before the sandstorm, the Byzantine general Gregory rode out to
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challenge al-Walid to single combat. Al-Walid did not decline, instead he sent his second,
Ubaidah, to face the Greek and after long struggle killed the last Byzantine general on the
field. Immediately thereafter arose the sandstorm that seemingly came as blessing from
Allah and the Muslims launched a full assault.143 The entire Muslim-Byzantine line was
engaged with an incredibly fierce attack on the Byzantine left which included Qanateer’s
Rus and Slavs. During the storm the cavalry of al-Walid rode round the Byzantine lines
and took Qanateer’s corps from the rear , also engaging the Byzantine cavalry which was
blinded and not yet committed. The Slavs and Rus resisted fiercely but were no match for
the attack. 144
Realizing that his left flank might be rolled up, Mahan committed his cavalry
reserve piecemeal which were likewise destroyed piecemeal against the larger Muslim
cavalry force. In this situation the light Muslim cavalry held the advantage over the
heavier Byzantine cavalry. The Byzantine cavalry that did survive retreated northwards
and left the infantry to its fate. Slowly and irreversibly the Byzantine infantry, Greco-
Europeans, Armenians, Russians, were caught in the inexorable steam roller. Though
defeat stared them in the face, the Byzantine infantry retreated in good order towards the
ravine.145 It was however, too late and the Byzantine infantry found themselves in a
pocket from which there was no escape. They were pushed together so much that they
were unable to use their weapons freely and soon they retreated, attempting to find a way
through the ravine, unsuccessfully. Some of the Byzantines fell into the ravine whilst the
others fell fighting or were captured, effectively ending the battle.146
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Losses amongst the Byzantine troops were horrific. It is difficult to gauge the
exact numbers but it is estimated that two-thirds of the Byzantine troops who fought at
the Yarmouk died during the battle or the ensuing fight along the ravine.147 Muslim
losses too have never been made clear but even the most conservative estimates give at
least one-third losses for the Muslims. In the aftermath of the battle Mahan retreated
northwards towards Damascus with his remaining cavalry. He was however, later killed
outside the city. The Muslim troops reentered Damascus and effectively Syria and
Palestine were under permanent Muslim control. 148
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
While there are numerous reasons to explain victories against the Persians and the
defeats suffered at the hands of the Muslims, one stands out as undisputed: Heraclius.
With the emperor leading his troops into battle, victory was assured. Without Heraclius
victory against a wild and skilled foe was almost impossible even with numerical
superiority. The victories against the Persians were the result of a relatively untested, but
genius general and emperor using tactics and strategy that were simply revolutionary.
The combined arms tactics outlined in the Strategikon were used to the utmost effect by
Heraclius in Mesopotamia. This, combined with unexpected strikes to relatively weak
areas, similar to the German Blitzkriegs of 1939 and 1940, served to provide the
Byzantines with a victory that effectively ended the last battle of antiquity. 149 Heraclius
possessed the genius to use the combined arms tactics to their fullest effect and beat the
Persians in the field. However, the Arab invasions were quite the opposite and could be
defined as the first wars of the Middle Ages. The strategy of the Arabs was so unlike that
of the Persians that the Byzantine commanders who faced them were unable to cope with
their implications and the novel strategy used by the Muslims. Even with the lack of
familiarity with Muslim tactics, Heraclius would have recognized the need for aggressive
action against the Muslims. It is probable that Heraclius could have defeated the Muslims
149 Geoffrey Regan, First Crusader: Byzantium’s Holy Wars, (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2001),
156.
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at the Yarmouk and send them back into Arabia. Even if he was unable to achieve
victory is it highly unlikely that the Emperor would have allowed his forces to be
defeated in detail and finally slaughtered along the ravines.
The Byzantines, who would have preferred to have bled the Arabs in lengthy
sieges, could not afford this luxury as many of their great cities were willing to welcome
the Muslims as liberators.150 Instead the Byzantines were forced to fight battles on the
Muslim’s strategy: an open battlefield that favored Muslim mobility over Byzantine
strength. Instead Mahan, though a fine commander in the traditional sense, was not
prepared to use every tool he possessed to his advantage. But perhaps worst of all and
most unforeseeable of all was the unfortunate timing of the sandstorm that blinded the
Byzantines and turned what could have ended as a stalemate into a catastrophe whose
implications are felt to this day. Ultimately, Heraclius’ illness during the most crucial
battle of his reign resulted in defeat and the Emperor was not there to force the Arabs into
facing an army that effectively used its infantry, cavalry, and archers. Heraclius was not
there to repeat his triumph. Instead his absence resulted in a catastrophic defeat for the
Byzantine Empire. After hearing of the defeat at the Yarmouk River, Heraclius said his
eloquent farewell, fully knowing that there would never again be a chance as good as the
Battle of the Yarmouk River for containing Islam. His goodbye was succinct and
sorrowful, “Farewell Syria, my fair province. Thou art an enemy's now and forever.” 151
150 Kaegi, Walter. Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests. (New York, Cambridge Press. 1992.) 135.
151 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. C. De Boor (Leipzig, 1883) 162.
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APPENDIX B
MUSLIM AND BYZANTINE MOVEMENTS AT THE BATTLE OF YARMOUK
INITIAL TROOP DEPLOYMENTS
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